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TRINITY AND CONSISTENCY 
James Cain 
P. T. Geach has argued that it is impossible to demonstrate that the doctrine of 
the Trinity is consistent. I try to show why-on a common understanding of 
the notion of consistency-his reasoning is flawed and why, on Geach's own 
principles, one should expect that if the doctrine of the Trinity is true then it 
will be possible to prove that the doctrine is consistent, and it will be possible 
to do this in a way that makes no appeal to the truth of any religious doctrine. 
Of course I did not and do not claim to understand the inner life of 
God; but the doctrine of the Trinity, as Newman pointed out, can be 
stated in a small number of theses, each of which can be grasped and 
held with real assent. Proving that this is a consistent set of theses 
is quite another thing, and I made no claims to have such a proof . 
. . . A general proof of consistency, which would at once enable one 
to dismiss all such attacks, is certainly not going to be available to 
mortal man. If the propositions in which the doctrine of the Trinity 
is formulated could be proved to be a consistent set, then a fortiori 
each one would have been proved possibly true. But as regards the 
inner life and mutual relations of the Divine Persons, there is no dif-
ference between possible and necessary truth .... Since in this realm 
possible and necessary truth coincide, proving the possible truth of 
Trinitarian theses would mean proving their truth, which is certainly 
not possible to mortal man.-Peter Geach1 
If the reasoning in this passage is correct, Geach has established a very 
important claim in philosophical theology, viz., that there can be no proof 
that the doctrine of the Trinity is consistent. In the first section below I 
will try to show that the reasoning in this passage is faulty-or, at least 
that it is so on a very common understanding of the notion of consistency. 
The following section will discuss a method that one might try to use to 
demonstrate the consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity. As we shall see 
Geach's own principles seem to dictate that if the doctrine of the Trinity is 
true then a consistency proof-one which makes no appeal to the truth of 
any religious doctrines-is possible. The final section will reevaluate the 
above argument using alternative accounts of consistency. 
Section One: Geach's Argument Criticized 
Geach's argument relies on the following two assumptions, which will be 
my focus. 
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(1) If a set of propositions is consistent then each proposition in the set 
is possibly true.2 
(2) If a proposition concerns the inner life and mutual relations of Di-
vine Persons, then it is possibly true if and only if it is necessarily 
true. 
In presenting his argument Geach does not explicitly define the notion of 
consistency. Typically in logic a set of propositions is said to be consistent 
just in case it is not possible to deduce from it an explicit contradiction, i.e., 
a proposition of the form (P & -P). For the time being I will employ this 
notion of consistency. (Later I will consider the argument using alternative 
notions of consistency.) In terms of assumptions (1) and (2), Geach's argu-
ment can be stated as follows. If the doctrine of the Trinity is consistent, 
then by (1) each proposition in the doctrine is possibly true, and thus by (2) 
each proposition in the doctrine is necessarily true. But propositions that 
are necessarily true are true. Given this reasoning we could convert a proof 
of the consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity into a proof of the truth of 
the doctrine. But, Geach holds, the latter is impossible for mortal man? It 
follows that mortal man cannot prove the consistency of the doctrine. 
For this argument to work (1) and (2) must be true on a single fixed 
reading of the notion of possibility. I will claim that they are not. But first I 
want to consider a particular reading that might make the argument look 
plausible and explain why the argument fails on that reading. Suppose 
that (1) and (2) are read as involving metaphysical possibility. A proposi-
tion expresses a metaphysical possibility if it describes a way things could 
have been.4 When it comes to the inner life and mutual relations of Divine 
Persons, it might seem that there is only one way things could have been; 
there are no contingent matters in this realm (even if there exists no God at 
all, on this line of thought, that is not a contingent matter). If this is correct, 
then in this realm metaphysical possibility and metaphysical necessity co-
incide, and thus (2) holds. It may also seem that (1) holds when read as 
concerning metaphysical possibility, but that is not the case: consistency 
does not guarantee metaphysical possibility. A couple of examples should 
help to make this clear. One could hold a consistent theory that claims that, 
say, gold is a compound of aluminum and phosphorus. The theory would 
of course contain a falsehood, but it need not lead to a contradiction. The 
fact that "Gold is a compound of aluminum and phosphorus" is a consis-
tent proposition does not show that it expresses a metaphysical possibil-
ity. In fact it expresses a metaphysically impossibility: any compound of 
aluminum and phosphorus, no matter how much it resembled gold, just 
would not be gold. For a second example consider arithmetic (the theory 
of the natural numbers under the operations of successor, addition and 
multiplication). In the realm of arithmetic there is "no difference between 
possible and necessary truth"; there are no contingent truths of arithmetic. 
At least this is the case if "possible" and "necessary" are understood as 
expressing metaphysical possibility and necessity. Note however that the 
consistency of an arithmetical proposition does not show that it is possibly 
true in this sense. From Godel's incompleteness theorem it follows that for 
any consistent, decidable set S of true first order sentences in the language 
of arithmetic there will be some sentence A in the language of arithmetic 
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such that neither A nor -A is deducible from 5.5 From this it follows that 
both A and -A are consistent with 5, and thus also consistent on their own. 
Yet one of the pair will express a metaphysically necessary truth of arith-
metic, and the other will express a metaphysical impossibility. 
So Geach's argument fails if it is understood to involve metaphysical 
possibility and necessity. Might another notion of possibility be found 
on which (1) and (2) hold true together? I think that under plausible as-
sumptions concerning validity and the logical structure of simple subject-
predicate propositions, and under the assumption (which I shall make for 
the course of the argument) that the doctrine of the Trinity is true, it is not 
difficult to see that the answer is negative. If (1) and (2) hold on a fixed 
reading of possibility they will take us from the consistency of a proposi-
tion about the inner life and mutual relations of the Divine Persons to 
the necessary truth of that proposition. So to show that (1) and (2) cannot 
hold on a single reading of possibility it will be enough to show that there 
is a consistent proposition (that is, a proposition from which an explicit 
contradiction cannot be deduced) that concerns this subject matter and 
is false. To do this I will add a single false proposition to the doctrine of 
the Trinity and show that from this proposition there cannot be a deduc-
tion of a proposition of the form (P & -P). I will proceed in stages. First 
I will add a partially interpreted sentence to the doctrine and consider 
two ways of completing the interpretation of the sentence. One complete 
interpretation of the sentence will yield a true proposition concerning the 
inner life of God, and the other will yield a false proposition concerning 
the inner life of God. It will be argued that if an explicit contradiction 
could be derived from the false proposition, then an explicit contradiction 
could also, per impossible, be derived from the true proposition. Hence the 
false proposition must be consistent. 
Consider the partially interpreted sentence" a is unbegotten," where 
"a" is an uninterpreted proper name. On the first (complete) interpreta-
tion let" a" be a name referring to the first person of the Trinity; on this 
interpretation "a is unbegotten" is a true proposition.6 On the second in-
terpretation let" a" be a name referring to the second person of the Trin-
ity; here we have a false proposition. Suppose that there is a deduction 
of an explicit contradiction (P & -P) from the proposition "a is unbegot-
ten" (second interpretation). Thus the argument from "a is unbegotten" 
(second interpretation) to (P & -P) is valid. Then, unless there is a hidden 
difference between the logical structure of the proposition" a is unbegot-
ten" (second interpretation) and the proposition "a is unbegotten" (first 
interpretation), the corresponding argument (under the first interpreta-
tion) from "a is unbegotten" to (P & -P) will also be valid.7 Of course if a 
proper name were (in Russell's terminology) a disguised description, or if 
a proper name somehow stood in for a cluster of descriptions, there could 
be significantly different logical structures associated with" a is unbegot-
ten" under the two interpretations, and this could result in there being 
a deduction of an explicit contradiction from one but not the other. For 
example, suppose that proper names are really disguised descriptions. If 
"a" was short for "the begotten Divine Person" then from" a is unbegot-
ten" we could deduce the contradiction "a is begotten and a is not begot-
ten." But if "a" was short for "the unbegotten Divine Person who begets 
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another" then from" a is unbegotten" we could not deduce the contradic-
tion "a is begotten and a is not begotten" 
I will assume however that it is incorrect to treat proper names as dis-
guised descriptions or disguised clusters of descriptions, and that the criti-
cisms Kripke raises against these views are substantially correct.8 Further-
more I contend that on the most plausible account of proper names there 
is no relevant difference in the logical structure of II a is unbegotten" under 
the two interpretations that would allow the deduction of a sentence of the 
form lip & -P" in one case but not allow a formally parallel deduction of 
a sentence of the form "P & -P" in the other case. On what is perhaps the 
most common account of proper names, a proper name is held to be logi-
cally simple-it has no associated logically complex structure. On such an 
account a deduction of an explicit contradiction from" a is unbegotten" on 
one interpretation will allow a formally parallel deduction of an explicit 
contradiction on the other interpretation. Since II a is unbegotten" is true 
on the first interpretation, it follows that there can be no deduction of an 
explicit contradiction from" a is unbegotten" under either interpretation. 
Geach of course has a theory of proper names that is at odds with the 
one just sketched. It might be helpful to see how this example would be 
handled using Geach's theory. Unlike Kripke's account, in which proper 
names have no descriptive content, Geach holds that a proper name car-
ries as part of its sense a criterion of identity, where the criterion of iden-
tity determines what the name is a name for. 9 Note that Geach does not 
hold that the criterion of identity associated with a proper name uniquely 
singles out the reference of the name. For example, if "King" and "Fido" 
are names for dogs they are associated with the same criterion of iden-
tity (same dog) even if they differ in reference (i.e., they pick out differ-
ent dogs). Geach holds that a proper name does not carry any further 
descriptive sense beyond supplying a criterion of identity. To handle this 
feature of Geach's account of proper names we add to our example the 
stipulation that both interpretations associate the name" a" with the cri-
terion of identity for being the same divine person, otherwise the interpre-
tations remain the same; i.e., on the first interpretation "a" refers to the 
first person of the Trinity and on the second interpretation" a" refers to 
the second person of the Trinity. On Geach's treatment of proper names 
there will not be a difference in the logical structure of "a is unbegotten" 
under the two interpretations that would allow the argument from II a is 
unbegotten" to (P & -P) to be valid under one interpretation of" a" but not 
under the other. Thus my earlier argument still holds. If II a is unbegotten" 
is consistent under one reading it is also consistent under the other read-
ing. But of course "a is unbegotten" is true-and thus consistent-under 
the first interpretation. 
Thus we see that under a plausible account of proper names-either 
the account that treats proper names as logically simple or Geach's own 
account of proper names-there can be consistent yet false propositions 
about the "the inner life and mutual relations of Divine Persons." If that 
is correct then Geach fails in his attempt to argue that it is impossible for 
mortal man to prove the consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity. In my 
criticism I have relied on a particular reading of the notion of consistency. 
The question arises whether under an alternative reading of the notion 
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of consistency Geach's argument is sound. I will return to this question 
in the final section, but for the moment I will remain focused on the no-
tion of consistency with which we began in order to reassess the question 
of whether (on this understanding of consistency) it is possible to give a 
proof of the consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity. 
Section Two: Is a General Proof of Consistency Possible? 
Surprisingly, some of Geach's other claims would seem to imply that there 
can be a "general proof of consistency" for the doctrine of the Trinity. As 
Geach notes, the doctrine of the Trinity can be stated in a small number of 
theses. Let PI' ... , Pn abbreviate such a set of theses. One who thinks that 
the doctrine is inconsistent (and has studied a little logic) will then hold 
that the argument "PI' ... , Pn-I' ergo not-(Pn)" is valid. Geach tells us: 
Truth cannot clash with truth. If the doctrines of the Faith are true, 
they can conflict neither with one another nor with truths in some 
other domain. An argument that purports to show such a conflict 
must thus be regarded as no proof but a fallacy; and any fallacy can 
in principle be exposed by producing some unexceptionable coun-
terexample, an argument of the same form in which the premises are 
uncontroversially true and the conclusion is uncontroversially false. 
And the logic needed will just be ordinary logic, universally acces-
sible and acceptable, not logic accessible only to 'baptised reason', 
whatever that may be. lll 
On Geach's account then there will be a counterexample to the argument 
"PI' ... , Pn-I' ergo not-(Pn)·" It will be an argument "pt, ... , Pn/' ergo 
not-(p n *)" which is "of the same form in which the premises are uncontro-
versially true an the conclusion is uncontroversially false." Of course in 
that case pt, ... , Pn * will be of the same form as PI' ... , Pn (the theses that 
make up the doctrine of the Trinity) and each of the pts will be uncon-
troversially true. This will provide a "general proof of consistency, which 
would at once enable one to dismiss all such attacks" on the consistency 
of the doctrine. Note that this is just how one would expect a defense of 
the consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity to go. One would produce a 
set of propositions that is formally parallel to the doctrine of the Trinity 
and in which each proposition is clearly true. II Peter van Inwagen in fact 
has a well known paper, based on Geach's treatment of relative identity, in 
which he basically attempts just such a proof of consistency. 12 
Section Three: Alternative Concepts of Consistency 
In assessing Geach's argument for the claim that the consistency of the 
doctrine of the Trinity cannot be proven I have fixed upon a particular 
understanding of the notion of consistency-viz., a set of propositions is 
consistent provided that an explicit contradiction cannot be deduced from 
the set. Call this the logical notion of consistency and say that a set of prop-
ositions is logically consistent if it meets this criterion. Since Geach does 
not provide a definition of consistent set of propositions in the passage cited 
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at the beginning of the paper, one might wonder whether (a) Geach may 
have used a nonequivalent notion of consistency, or (regardless of Geach's 
understanding of consistency) whether (b) Geach's argument could be re-
formulated using a different notion of consistency so that it is sound and 
significant under the alternative understanding of consistency. In this sec-
tion I will take up these two concerns, starting with (a). 
Geach has developed a broad and interesting account of consistency 
which has applicability to theoretical judgment, belief, command, coun-
sel, and practical reason.13 Our focus will be on the consistency of a set of 
propositions. In his essay "Why Logic Matters," Geach's explains proposi-
tional inconsistency as follows: 
any inconsistency except the flat inconsistency of contradictories has 
itself to be explained in terms of valid inferences from a set of prem-
ises, leading both to a conclusion and its contradictory.14 
This account of inconsistency appears to be equivalent to the one I have 
employed,15 and it is typical of the way Geach has developed the notion of 
consistency over the years.16 Furthermore, Geach introduces the version 
of his argument for the unprovability of the consistency of the doctrine 
of the Trinity as it appears in the article "Nominalism" (see note 1) with 
the words: 
Modem logicians like Church and Godel have shown what a severe 
requirement the demand for a general consistency proof is; as re-
gards many theories, the demand is demonstrably unreasonable. 
And as regards the doctrine of the Trinity in particular we can see 
that a demand for a consistency proof could never be satisfied. 
The notion of consistency employed by these modem logicians is equiva-
lent to that of the nondeducibility (in a given system) of an explicit contra-
diction.17 For these reasons I believe that I have given a fair representation 
of the notion of consistency as it appears in Geach's argument. 1S 
But, as noted above, the question arises whether Geach's argument 
could be reformulated using a different notion of consistency, and if so 
whether such an argument might yield important insights concerning the 
doctrine of the Trinity. As a first attempt, one might be inclined to relax 
the notion of consistency and say that a set of propositions is conceptually 
consistent if the conjunction of its members is not analytically false. 19 I do 
not think that replacing the notion of consistency in the first premise by 
conceptual consistency will rescue Geach's argument. Consider again the 
two readings of II a is unbegotten" (on the first reading II a" refers to the first 
person of the Trinity, and on the second reading II a" refers to the second 
person of the Trinity). If proper names have no descriptive content (be-
yond possibly conveying a criterion of identity) then if either reading of II a 
is unbegotten" is not analytically false, then neither reading is analytically 
false. But on the first reading the proposition is true and thus not analyti-
cally false. Thus the second reading provides a false but conceptually con-
sistent proposition about the inner life of God. So Geach's argument will 
not work on this reading of "consistency." 
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Another approach would be to interpret" consistent" to mean "jointly 
possible," so that a set of propositions is consistent if and only if it is pos-
sible for all the propositions in the set to come out true together. On such a 
reading the first premise will of course be trivially true. 20 Whether the sec-
ond premise is true will depend on exactly what is meant by "possible." If 
by "possible" we mean "conceptually possible" (= not analytically false), 
then the second premise fails: in the earlier example "a is unbegotten" is 
not analytically false under the second reading, and yet it is not a neces-
sary truth. 
Another way to understand "consistent" to mean "jointly possible" 
is in terms of metaphysical possibility: a set of propositions is consistent 
in this sense if and only if there is some possible world in which all the 
propositions in the set are true together.21 On this reading the first premise 
is trivially true, and the second premise makes the plausible claim that 
what is true in any possible world concerning "the inner life and mutual 
relations of Divine Persons" is also true in all possible worlds. So on this 
reading the argument purports to show that no human can prove that 
there is a possible world in which the doctrine of the Trinity is true (for 
such a proof could be converted into a proof of the doctrine of the Trinity 
s actually true). 
I have no objection per se to this argument,22 though I believe that its 
usage of the term "consistent" engenders confusion in two ways. First, 
:It is simply a different notion of consistency than we normally use, ei-
ther in everyday life or in philosophical discussion. To take an example, if 
someone held that water is really an element and that there are atoms (in 
the sense in which Democritus used the term) of water, then that person 
would hold a theory that is not true with respect to any possible world, 
and yet we would not have any basis for holding his theory to be inconsis-
tent (as we normally use the term). 
Second, discussions of the consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity are 
in general squarely concerned with the logical or conceptual notion of 
consistency. To many people the doctrine of the Trinity appears to imply 
contradictory propositions-e.g., that there is exactly one God and that 
there is not exactly one God but three Gods; or that the Father and the 
Son are the same and yet they are not the same. If there could be a general 
proof of the logical or conceptual consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity, 
that would of great importance to philosophical theology. This is simply a 
different question from whether we could prove that there is a metaphysi-
cally possible world in which the doctrine of the Trinity is true. 
I will end with a final remark on the relationship between the concerns 
of modern logicians with consistency proofs and the question of whether 
there can be a proof of the consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity. Geach 
is of course quite right to point out that the work of modern logicians 
has "shown what a severe requirement the demand for a general con-
sistency proof is; as regards many theories, the demand is demonstrably 
unreasonable." Philosophers should be cautious about demanding proofs 
of consistency. On the other hand it is generally recognized that, for ex-
ample, the constraints on proving the consistency of a given formalization 
of arithmetic arise from peculiar features of the formalization involving 
its complexity. We have little reason to expect that the same troubles will 
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arise with respect to demonstrating the consistency of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. As far as I can see, Geach's argument does not give us any further 
reason to think that the logical consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity 
cannot be proven.23 
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1. Peter Geach, Truth and Hope (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2001), p. 41. Essentially the same argument is found in Geach, "N ominal-
ism," Logic Matters (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 293, which 
originally appeared in Sophia 3 (1964), pp. 3-14; see p. 6 for the argument. 
2. In his writings Geach generally uses the term "proposition" (uncapi-
talized) to mean "a form of words in which something is propounded, put 
forward for consideration" (Logic Matters, p. 255; see also, Reference and Gener-
ality, Third Edition (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 51) 
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age "statement" appears to imply assertoric force, whereas a proposition (in 
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phers) can appear unasserted, e.g., as a clause in a conditional. Unfortunately 
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a set of statements." Throughout this paper I will use the term "proposition" 
in conformity with Geach's usage. 
3. Though Geach does not tell us in this passage why mortal man cannot 
prove that the doctrine of the Trinity is true, elsewhere he discusses Aquinas' 
reason for holding that natural reason cannot inform us about the distinction 
of the Divine Persons; see P. T. Geach, The Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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4. The expressions "metaphysical possibility" and "metaphysical necessi-
ty" come from Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1980), which is based on Kripke's lectures given in 
1970 at Princeton University. The clarification Kripke brought to modal con-
cepts of course came well after the original appearance of Geach's argument 
in 1964 (see note 1). 
5. I am simplifying somewhat to avoid bringing in too many technicali-
ties. 
6. Recall that we are using the term "proposition" in Geach's sense in 
which a proposition is "a form of words in which something is propounded." 
7. The interpretation of "a" will differ in the two arguments. If "a" occurs 
in the conclusion then the conclusion will be differently interpreted in the two 
arguments. Nonetheless under either interpretation the conclusion will be an 
explicit contradiction. 
8. For the purposes of my argument it is not actually necessary to accept 
Kripke's full criticism of accounts of proper names that treat proper names as 
disguised descriptions or clusters of descriptions. It is enough to hold that at 
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least sometimes proper names are logically simple (they do not have a descrip-
tive content as part of their sense), and that the name "a" as is occurs in my 
example is logically simple. 
9. Reference and Generality, pp. 68-71. 
10. Truth and Hope, p. 40. 
11. Even if the set of propositions formally parallel to those used to ex-
press the doctrine of the Trinity was merely consistent, that would still imply 
the consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity. In the passage quoted above 
Geach claims that" any fallacy can in principle be exposed by producing some 
unexceptionable counterexample, an argument of the same form in which the 
premises are uncontroversially true and the conclusion is uncontroversially 
false." Whether or not there will always be a counterexample with uncontro-
versially true premises and an uncontroversially false conclusion is an issue 
we need not pursue. 
12. Though perhaps van Inwagen's examples are merely consistent (see 
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actually true. See Peter van Inwagen, "And Yet They are Not Three Gods but 
One God" in Thomas V. Morris (ed.), Philosophy and the Christian Faith (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp. 241-78. I do not know how 
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Geach's own treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity in terms of his theory of 
relative identity see his "Aquinas" in G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach, Three 
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See also my "The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Logic of Relative Identity," 
Religious Studies 25 (June 1989), pp. 141-52. For recent criticisms and a survey 
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of the Trinity," Philosophia Christi 5 (2003), pp. 431-46. 
13. See for example Chapter Three of Truth and Hope; Chapter Two of Rea-
son and Argument, and "Imperative Inference," Analysis 23 (Supplement, Janu-
ary 1963), pp. 37-42 (Reprinted in Logic Matters, pp. 278-85). 
14. "Why Logic Matters" in H. D. Lewis (ed.), Contemporary British Philoso-
phy, 4th Series (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976), p. 98. 
15. If from a set of propositions an explicit contradiction can be deduced 
then the set of propositions is certainly inconsistent according to Geach's cri-
teria. On the other hand, suppose that a set S of propositions is inconsistent 
according to Geach's criteria. Then either one of two cases hold. In the simple 
case S already contains a pair of contradictory propositions (i.e., we have "the 
Hat inconsistency of contradictories"). Otherwise S doesn't contain a pair of 
contradictory propositions, but from S a pair of contradictory propositions 
can be inferred. Either way from S a pair of contradictory propositions validly 
follow, and from a pair of contradictory propositions an explicit contradiction 
will follow. To see how, on Geach's account, we may go from the fact that a set 
S of propositions leads to contradictory conclusions to the claim that S validly 
implies an explicit contradiction, we may reason as follows. Let S be a set of 
propositions from which a pair of contradictory propositions follow and let A 
be an arbitrary proposition. Then the same pair of contradictory conclusions 
which validly follow from S also validly follow from S u {-A}, and also from 
S u {A}. Thus applying the rule reductio ad absurdum (as set out in Reason and 
A.rgument, p. 67) we may infer that S implies both A and -A, from which we 
conclude that S implies the explicit contradiction (A & -A). 
16. For similar accounts see "Imperative Inference," p. 38 (pp. 280-81 in 
the Logic Matters reprint) which originally appeared in 1963; Reason and Argu-
ment (1976), pp. 8-9; and Harry A. Lewis (ed.), Peter Geach: Philosophical En-
counters (Dordrecht: Klewer Academic Publishers, 1991), pp. 99-100. 
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17. Godel also employs the notion of G)-consistency, but that need not con-
cern us here. 
18. In addition it should be noted that in the discussion following the pas-
sage quoted at the beginning of this paper Geach again alludes to the work 
done in modem logic on consistency proofs, and he identifies consistency with 
freedom from contradiction; see Truth and Hope, pp. 41-43. This is a further in-
dication that the notion of consistency used in his argument is the one which 
has been of concern to modem logicians, i.e., the logical notion of consistency 
used in the first two sections of this paper. 
19. This definition only applies to finite sets of propositions, which is all 
that concerns us here. Though this is a common (and I believe perfectly legiti-
mate) notion of consistency, it is doubtful that Geach would find it acceptable, 
given his doubts about the notion of analyticity. See, for example, Geach, Rea-
SOil and Argument, pp. 73-74. 
20. I will assume that the notion of possibility used to explain consistency 
is the same as the notion used throughout the remainder of the argument. 
21. A referee suggested that I consider whether Geach may have intended 
to use the notion of consistency in accordance with this definition. Another 
reader has suggested that I consider a notion of consistency in which a set 
S of propositions is consistent if and only if no contradiction follows from S 
together with other metaphysically necessary propositions. Where S is finite 
(as in the case of the doctrine of the Trinity) this notion of consistency comes 
to the same thing as the 'joint possibility' notion of consistency under consid-
eration. This can be shown as follows. Case 1: S is jointly possible. Thus since 
all the members of S can be true together, a contradiction cannot follow from 
the members of S together with propositions that are necessarily truth. Case 2: 
S is not jointly possible. Let P be the conjunction of the members of S. Since S is 
not jointly possible, ~P is true is all possible world, and thus ~P is a necessary 
truth. From S together with the necessary truth ~P we may deduce the explicit 
contradiction (P & ~P). 
22. Here it may be worth noting that if I am wrong in my interpretation 
of Geach's writing and he really intended to use the notion of consistency to 
argue along the lines currently under consideration, then my previous objec-
tions do not apply to his argument. 
23. For helpful comments on an earlier draft I would like to thank the ref-
erees and the editor of this journal. 
